

you our thanks from the largest city on the U.S.-Mexico border.

I support this bill because I do represent more than 2,500 agents in El Paso. In addition, for the more than 21,000 agents on our northern and southern borders, this is an important bill that provides a consistent and reliable pay system that addresses problems in administratively uncontrollable overtime and provides more predictable work schedules for our Border Patrol agents.

We ask these brave men and women to put their lives on the line to do what I think is the toughest job in Federal employment, but so far we have failed to provide financial certainty both to those agents and to their families.

I want to remind my colleagues that El Paso, Texas, the community I have the honor of representing, which is conjoined with Ciudad Juarez to form the largest truly binational community in the world, is the safest city in the State of Texas today. It is the safest city in the United States, and that is not an anomaly. It has been the safest city in America 4 years running, and we have, in large part, to thank the Border Patrol agents who help to secure our border for that. Not only do they keep our communities and our country secure, they do it in a very professional way. In 2013, there were exactly zero complaints filed against the Border Patrol in the El Paso sector. So I want to thank them for the great job that they do.

This bill creates a reliable pay system that responsibly secures our border. Supporting our agents, which this bill does, is the key to keeping our border communities and our country safe.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to thank Mr. O'ROURKE for his passion on this issue. He is a fine gentleman to work with on these types of issues and others. I am happy to serve with him on both Homeland Security and in this body. I thank him for his good work.

There has been good bipartisan work on both sides of the aisle and in both bodies to get to this point today.

I also thank ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON for her personal commitment to these issues, and Federal workers in general.

This truly is a win-win situation. We make life better for Border Patrol agents and their families. We give more certainty to them and their families to help them with their mortgages. We also happen to save money for the American taxpayer. I appreciate the creativity and good work to get to this point.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. CLARKE), the ranking member of the Cybersecurity Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security.

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the distin-

guished ranking member from the District of Columbia, Ms. HOLMES NORTON, for yielding me this time, and I want to thank the gentleman from Utah (Mr. CHAFFETZ) for his leadership on these very important matters of homeland security.

I rise today in support of S. 1691, and I am pleased that today we are considering legislation containing language I introduced earlier this year to address fundamental cyber workforce challenges at the Department of Homeland Security. Important parts of my bipartisan bill, H.R. 3107, the Homeland Security Cybersecurity Boots-on-the-Ground Act, are included in the measure we are considering today.

The cyber workforce language included in S. 1691 generally does two important things. First, it grants special hiring authority to DHS to bring on board topnotch cyber recruits. The Department desperately needs a more flexible hiring process with incentives to secure talent in today's highly competitive cyber skills market. Second, it requires the Secretary of the Department to assess its cyber workforce to give Congress and the Office of Personnel Management a clearer picture of the needs and challenges that DHS faces in carrying out its important cyber mission in helping protect both the dot-gov and dot-com arenas.

Importantly, the bill also directs the Comptroller General to analyze, monitor, and report on the implementation of DHS cybersecurity workforce measures.

Today, many of the Department's top cyber positions are filled by nonpermanent contractors, and DHS reports having difficulty competing with other executive branch agencies and the private sector for talent. In an effort to address DHS's cyber workforce challenges, the Department asked the Homeland Security Advisory Committee to assemble a task force on cyber skills to provide recommendations on the best ways DHS can foster the development of a national cybersecurity workforce and DHS can improve its capability to recruit and retain cybersecurity talent.

The legislation I introduced sought to address a number of the task force's key recommendations, as does this bill, S. 1691. Cybersecurity is a complex mission for the Department and requires a wide range of talent at all levels. Given the urgent nature of the DHS' recruitment efforts, it is essential the Department have at its disposal certain hiring authorities and training procedures in place.

Before I close, I would like to acknowledge that there is a lot of interest on our side of the aisle to make progress on cybersecurity. Hopefully, in the coming days, old jurisdictional squabbles can be laid aside for the betterment of the country, as was done on this bill, and again, the Oversight Committee can work with the Homeland Security Committee to bring forth critical cybersecurity legislation. We

need to put in place legislation to advance the ball with respect to protecting Federal civilian networks and codifying DHS' role.

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Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

I want to say how much I appreciate the views of the two Members who have spoken, the bipartisan way in which this bill has been handled in the House and in the Senate, and look forward to more bipartisanship to come, Mr. CHAFFETZ.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

In conclusion, I thank the gentlewoman from Washington, D.C. I look forward to working with her on a host of issues as we serve on the same committee. I can only hope that as many of them can be as bipartisan as possible. We both have a tenacious nature to fight to represent the constituencies which we represent, and do so in the spirit of making this country better.

Really, that is the reason that this bill has come here today with good, broad bipartisan support. I cannot thank enough Brandon Judd from the National Border Patrol Council. He heads that group. He has been absolutely wonderful on this issue, good leadership from him.

It is my honor to recommend to my colleagues and urge all Members to support the passage of S. 1691.

With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Utah (Mr. CHAFFETZ) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, S. 1691.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 4681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the Senate amendment is as follows:

Senate amendment:

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015".

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
 Sec. 2. Definitions.
 Sec. 3. Budgetary effects.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

- Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
 Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
 Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
 Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

- Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle A—General Matters

- Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
 Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
 Sec. 303. National intelligence strategy.
 Sec. 304. Software licensing.
 Sec. 305. Reporting of certain employment activities by former intelligence officers and employees.
 Sec. 306. Inclusion of Predominantly Black Institutions in intelligence officer training program.
 Sec. 307. Management and oversight of financial intelligence.
 Sec. 308. Analysis of private sector policies and procedures for countering insider threats.
 Sec. 309. Procedures for the retention of incidentally acquired communications.
 Sec. 310. Clarification of limitation of review to retaliatory security clearance or access determinations.
 Sec. 311. Feasibility study on consolidating classified databases of cyber threat indicators and malware samples.
 Sec. 312. Sense of Congress on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime cooperation with Ukraine.
 Sec. 313. Replacement of locally employed staff serving at United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation.
 Sec. 314. Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation and adjacent countries.

Subtitle B—Reporting

- Sec. 321. Report on declassification process.
 Sec. 322. Report on intelligence community efficient spending targets.
 Sec. 323. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.
 Sec. 324. Annual report on intelligence activities of the Department of Homeland Security.
 Sec. 325. Report on political prison camps in North Korea.
 Sec. 326. Assessment of security of domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure.
 Sec. 327. Enhanced contractor level assessments for the intelligence community.
 Sec. 328. Assessment of the efficacy of memoranda of understanding to facilitate intelligence-sharing.
 Sec. 329. Report on foreign man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons.
 Sec. 330. Report on United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.
 Sec. 331. Feasibility study on retraining veterans in cybersecurity.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence committees” means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

SEC. 3. BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled “Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation” for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2015 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

- (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
- (3) The Department of Defense.
- (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
- (5) The National Security Agency.
- (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
- (7) The Coast Guard.
- (8) The Department of State.
- (9) The Department of the Treasury.
- (10) The Department of Energy.
- (11) The Department of Justice.
- (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
- (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
- (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
- (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS AND PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2015, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4681 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR INCREASES.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize employ-

ment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2015 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element.

(b) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in—

(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;

(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or

(3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training.

(c) NOTICE TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2015 the sum of \$507,400,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.

(b) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 794 positions as of September 30, 2015. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(c) CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2015 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL.—In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2015, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2015 the sum of \$514,000,000.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS**Subtitle A—General Matters****SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.**

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 303. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 108 the following:

“SEC. 108A. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning in 2017, and once every 4 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop a comprehensive national intelligence strategy to meet national security objectives for the following 4-year period, or a longer period, if appropriate.

“(b) REQUIREMENTS.—Each national intelligence strategy required by subsection (a) shall—

“(1) delineate a national intelligence strategy consistent with—

“(A) the most recent national security strategy report submitted pursuant to section 108;

“(B) the strategic plans of other relevant departments and agencies of the United States; and

“(C) other relevant national-level plans;

“(2) address matters related to national and military intelligence, including counterintelligence;

“(3) identify the major national security missions that the intelligence community is currently pursuing and will pursue in the future to meet the anticipated security environment;

“(4) describe how the intelligence community will utilize personnel, technology, partnerships, and other capabilities to pursue the major national security missions identified in paragraph (3);

“(5) assess current, emerging, and future threats to the intelligence community, including threats from foreign intelligence and security services and insider threats;

“(6) outline the organizational roles and missions of the elements of the intelligence community as part of an integrated enterprise to meet customer demands for intelligence products, services, and support;

“(7) identify sources of strategic, institutional, programmatic, fiscal, and technological risk; and

“(8) analyze factors that may affect the intelligence community’s performance in pursuing the major national security missions identified in paragraph (3) during the following 10-year period.

“(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on each national intelligence strategy required by subsection (a) not later than 45 days after the date of the completion of such strategy.”

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENTS.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 108 the following new item:

“Sec. 108A. National intelligence strategy.”

SEC. 304. SOFTWARE LICENSING.

Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3044) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking “usage; and” and inserting “usage, including—

“(A) increasing the centralization of the management of software licenses;

“(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of comprehensive inventories of software licenses using automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;

“(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment decisions; and

“(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient software licenses management training; and”;

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “usage.” and inserting “usage, including—

“(A) increasing the centralization of the management of software licenses;

“(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of comprehensive inventories of software licenses using automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;

“(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment decisions; and

“(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient software licenses management training; and”;

(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) based on the assessment required under paragraph (2), make such recommendations with respect to software procurement and usage to the Director of National Intelligence as the Chief Information Officer considers appropriate.”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(d) IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence receives recommendations from the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community in accordance with subsection (b)(3), the Director of National Intelligence shall, to the extent practicable, issue guidelines for the intelligence community on software procurement and usage based on such recommendations.”

SEC. 305. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

(a) RESTRICTION.—Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 303 the following new section:

“SEC. 304. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—The head of each element of the intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring each employee of such element occupying a covered position to sign a written agreement requiring the regular reporting of covered employment to the head of such element.

“(b) AGREEMENT ELEMENTS.—The regulations required under subsection (a) shall provide that an agreement contain provisions requiring each employee occupying a covered position to, during the two-year period beginning on the date on which such employee ceases to occupy such covered position—

“(1) report covered employment to the head of the element of the intelligence community that employed such employee in such covered position upon accepting such covered employment; and

“(2) annually (or more frequently if the head of such element considers it appropriate) report covered employment to the head of such element.

“(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) COVERED EMPLOYMENT.—The term ‘covered employment’ means direct employment by, representation of, or the provision of advice relating to national security to the government of a foreign country or any person whose activities

are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of a foreign country.

“(2) COVERED POSITION.—The term ‘covered position’ means a position within an element of the intelligence community that, based on the level of access of a person occupying such position to information regarding sensitive intelligence sources or methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of such element determines should be subject to the requirements of this section.

“(3) GOVERNMENT OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY.—The term ‘government of a foreign country’ has the meaning given the term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).”

(b) REGULATIONS AND CERTIFICATION.—

(1) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall issue the regulations required under section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section.

(2) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—

(A) a certification that each head of an element of the intelligence community has prescribed the regulations required under section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section; or

(B) if the Director is unable to submit the certification described under subparagraph (A), an explanation as to why the Director is unable to submit such certification, including a designation of which heads of an element of the intelligence community have prescribed the regulations required under such section 304 and which have not.

(c) TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENTS.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended—

(1) by striking the second item relating to section 302 (Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries) and the items relating to sections 304, 305, and 306; and

(2) by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the following new item:

“Sec. 304. Reporting of certain employment activities by former intelligence officers and employees.”

SEC. 306. INCLUSION OF PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTIONS IN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.

Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3224) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting “and Predominantly Black Institutions” after “universities”; and

(2) in subsection (g)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:

“(4) PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTION.—The term ‘Predominantly Black Institution’ has the meaning given the term in section 318 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059e).”

SEC. 307. MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall prepare a plan for management of the elements of the intelligence community that carry out financial intelligence activities.

(b) CONTENTS OF PLAN.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall establish a governance framework, procedures for sharing and harmonizing the acquisition and use of financial analytic tools, standards for quality of analytic products, procedures for oversight and evaluation of resource allocations associated with the joint development of information sharing efforts

and tools, and an education and training model for elements of the intelligence community that carry out financial intelligence activities.

(c) **BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the actions the Director proposes to implement the plan required by subsection (a).

SEC. 308. ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE SECTOR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR COUNTERING INSIDER THREATS.

(a) **ANALYSIS.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the National Counterintelligence Executive, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an analysis of private sector policies and procedures for countering insider threats.

(b) **CONTENT.**—The analysis required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a review of whether and how the intelligence community could utilize private sector hiring and human resources best practices to screen, vet, and validate the credentials, capabilities, and character of applicants for positions involving trusted access to sensitive information;

(2) an analysis of private sector policies for holding supervisors and subordinates accountable for violations of established security protocols and whether the intelligence community should adopt similar policies for positions of trusted access to sensitive information;

(3) an assessment of the feasibility and advisability of applying mandatory leave policies, similar to those endorsed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission to identify fraud in the financial services industry, to certain positions within the intelligence community; and

(4) recommendations for how the intelligence community could utilize private sector risk indices, such as credit risk scores, to make determinations about employee access to sensitive information.

SEC. 309. PROCEDURES FOR THE RETENTION OF INCIDENTALLY ACQUIRED COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **COVERED COMMUNICATION.**—The term “covered communication” means any nonpublic telephone or electronic communication acquired without the consent of a person who is a party to the communication, including communications in electronic storage.

(2) **HEAD OF AN ELEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.**—The term “head of an element of the intelligence community” means, as appropriate—

(A) the head of an element of the intelligence community; or

(B) the head of the department or agency containing such element.

(3) **UNITED STATES PERSON.**—The term “United States person” has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).

(b) **PROCEDURES FOR COVERED COMMUNICATIONS.**—

(1) **REQUIREMENT TO ADOPT.**—Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act each head of an element of the intelligence community shall adopt procedures approved by the Attorney General for such element that ensure compliance with the requirements of paragraph (3).

(2) **COORDINATION AND APPROVAL.**—The procedures required by paragraph (1) shall be—

(A) prepared in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence; and

(B) approved by the Attorney General prior to issuance.

(3) **PROCEDURES.**—

(A) **APPLICATION.**—The procedures required by paragraph (1) shall apply to any intelligence collection activity not otherwise authorized by court order (including an order or certification

issued by a court established under subsection (a) or (b) of section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803)), subpoena, or similar legal process that is reasonably anticipated to result in the acquisition of a covered communication to or from a United States person and shall permit the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of covered communications subject to the limitation in subparagraph (B).

(B) **LIMITATION ON RETENTION.**—A covered communication shall not be retained in excess of 5 years, unless—

(i) the communication has been affirmatively determined, in whole or in part, to constitute foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or is necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence or counterintelligence;

(ii) the communication is reasonably believed to constitute evidence of a crime and is retained by a law enforcement agency;

(iii) the communication is enciphered or reasonably believed to have a secret meaning;

(iv) all parties to the communication are reasonably believed to be non-United States persons;

(v) retention is necessary to protect against an imminent threat to human life, in which case both the nature of the threat and the information to be retained shall be reported to the congressional intelligence committees not later than 30 days after the date such retention is extended under this clause;

(vi) retention is necessary for technical assurance or compliance purposes, including a court order or discovery obligation, in which case access to information retained for technical assurance or compliance purposes shall be reported to the congressional intelligence committees on an annual basis; or

(vii) retention for a period in excess of 5 years is approved by the head of the element of the intelligence community responsible for such retention, based on a determination that retention is necessary to protect the national security of the United States, in which case the head of such element shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a written certification describing—

(I) the reasons extended retention is necessary to protect the national security of the United States;

(II) the duration for which the head of the element is authorizing retention;

(III) the particular information to be retained; and

(IV) the measures the element of the intelligence community is taking to protect the privacy interests of United States persons or persons located inside the United States.

SEC. 310. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION OF REVIEW TO RETALIATORY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.

Section 3001(b)(7) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(b)(7)) is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “2014—” and inserting “2014, and consistent with subsection (j)—”;

(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking “to appeal a determination to suspend or revoke a security clearance or access to classified information” and inserting “alleging reprisal for having made a protected disclosure (provided the individual does not disclose classified information or other information contrary to law) to appeal any action affecting an employee’s access to classified information”;

(3) in subparagraph (B), by striking “information,” inserting “information following a protected disclosure.”

SEC. 311. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON CONSOLIDATING CLASSIFIED DATABASES OF CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND MALWARE SAMPLES.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the

Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall conduct a feasibility study on consolidating classified databases of cyber threat indicators and malware samples in the intelligence community.

(b) **ELEMENTS.**—The feasibility study required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An inventory of classified databases of cyber threat indicators and malware samples in the intelligence community.

(2) An assessment of actions that could be carried out to consolidate such databases to achieve the greatest possible information sharing within the intelligence community and cost savings for the Federal Government.

(3) An assessment of any impediments to such consolidation.

(4) An assessment of whether the Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise can support such consolidation.

(c) **REPORT TO CONGRESS.**—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence completes the feasibility study required by subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report that summarizes the feasibility study, including the information required under subsection (b).

SEC. 312. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CYBERSECURITY THREAT AND CYBERCRIME COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) cooperation between the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and Ukraine should be increased to improve cybersecurity policies between these two countries;

(2) the United States should pursue improved extradition procedures among the Governments of the United States, Ukraine, and other countries from which cybercriminals target United States citizens and entities;

(3) the President should—

(A) initiate a round of formal United States-Ukraine bilateral talks on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime cooperation, with additional multilateral talks that include other law enforcement partners such as Europol and Interpol; and

(B) work to obtain a commitment from the Government of Ukraine to end cybercrime directed at persons outside Ukraine and to work with the United States and other allies to deter and convict known cybercriminals;

(4) the President should establish a capacity building program with the Government of Ukraine, which could include—

(A) a joint effort to improve cyber capacity building, including intelligence and law enforcement services in Ukraine;

(B) sending United States law enforcement agents to aid law enforcement agencies in Ukraine in investigating cybercrimes; and

(C) agreements to improve communications networks to enhance law enforcement cooperation, such as a hotline directly connecting law enforcement agencies in the United States and Ukraine; and

(5) the President should establish and maintain an intelligence and law enforcement cooperation scorecard with metrics designed to measure the number of instances that intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the United States request assistance from intelligence and law enforcement agencies in Ukraine and the number and type of responses received to such requests.

SEC. 313. REPLACEMENT OF LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF SERVING AT UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENT.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State shall ensure that, not later than one year after the

date of the enactment of this Act, every supervisory position at a United States diplomatic facility in the Russian Federation shall be occupied by a citizen of the United States who has passed, and shall be subject to, a thorough background check.

(2) **EXTENSION.**—The Secretary of State may extend the deadline under paragraph (1) for up to one year by providing advance written notification and justification of such extension to the appropriate congressional committees.

(3) **PROGRESS REPORT.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on progress made toward meeting the employment requirement under paragraph (1).

(b) **PLAN FOR REDUCED USE OF LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with other appropriate government agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to further reduce the reliance on locally employed staff in United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation. The plan shall, at a minimum, include cost estimates, timelines, and numbers of employees to be replaced.

(c) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

- (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
- (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
- (3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(d) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to infringe on the power of the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.”

SEC. 314. INCLUSION OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES IN UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND ADJACENT COUNTRIES.

(a) **SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITY REQUIREMENT.**—Each United States diplomatic facility that, after the date of the enactment of this Act, is constructed in, or undergoes a construction upgrade in, the Russian Federation, any country that shares a land border with the Russian Federation, or any country that is a former member of the Soviet Union shall be constructed to include a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility.

(b) **NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.**—The Secretary of State may waive the requirement under subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States and submits a written justification to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 180 days before exercising such waiver.

(c) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

- (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
- (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
- (3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

Subtitle B—Reporting

SEC. 321. REPORT ON DECLASSIFICATION PROCESSES.

Not later than December 31, 2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing—

- (1) proposals to improve the declassification process throughout the intelligence community; and
- (2) steps the intelligence community could take, or legislation that may be necessary, to en-

able the National Declassification Center to better accomplish the missions assigned to the Center by Executive Order No. 13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707).

SEC. 322. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFICIENT SPENDING TARGETS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than April 1, 2016, and April 1, 2017, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce administrative costs for the intelligence community during the preceding year.

(b) **ELEMENTS.**—Each report under subsection (a) shall include for each element of the intelligence community the following:

(1) A description of the status and effectiveness of efforts to devise alternatives to government travel and promote efficient travel spending, such as teleconferencing and video conferencing.

(2) A description of the status and effectiveness of efforts to limit costs related to hosting and attending conferences.

(3) A description of the status and effectiveness of efforts to assess information technology inventories and usage, and establish controls, to reduce costs related to underutilized information technology equipment, software, or services.

(4) A description of the status and effectiveness of efforts to limit the publication and printing of hard copy documents.

(5) A description of the status and effectiveness of efforts to improve the performance of Federal fleet motor vehicles and limit executive transportation.

(6) A description of the status and effectiveness of efforts to limit the purchase of extraneous promotional items, such as plaques, clothing, and commemorative items.

(7) A description of the status and effectiveness of efforts to consolidate and streamline workforce training programs to focus on the highest priority workforce and mission needs.

(8) Such other matters relating to efforts to reduce intelligence community administrative costs as the Director may specify for purposes of this section.

SEC. 323. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE ORDER.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 511. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE ORDER.

“(a) **ANNUAL REPORTS REQUIRED.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on violations of law or executive order relating to intelligence activities by personnel of an element of the intelligence community that were identified during the previous calendar year.

“(b) **ELEMENTS.**—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall, consistent with the need to preserve ongoing criminal investigations, include a description of, and any action taken in response to, any violation of law or executive order (including Executive Order No. 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note)) relating to intelligence activities committed by personnel of an element of the intelligence community in the course of the employment of such personnel that, during the previous calendar year, was—

“(1) determined by the director, head, or general counsel of any element of the intelligence community to have occurred;

“(2) referred to the Department of Justice for possible criminal prosecution; or

“(3) substantiated by the inspector general of any element of the intelligence community.”.

(b) **INITIAL REPORT.**—The first report required under section 511 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be submitted not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) **GUIDELINES.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-

tor of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community, shall—

(1) issue guidelines to carry out section 511 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a); and

(2) submit such guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees.

(d) **TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT.**—The table of sections in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding after the item relating to section 510 the following new item:

“Sec. 511. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.”.

(e) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section shall be construed to alter any requirement existing on the date of the enactment of this Act to submit a report under any provision of law.

SEC. 324. ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—For each fiscal year and along with the budget materials submitted in support of the budget of the Department of Homeland Security pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report for such fiscal year on each intelligence activity of each intelligence component of the Department, as designated by the Under Secretary, that includes the following:

(1) The amount of funding requested for each such intelligence activity.

(2) The number of full-time employees funded to perform each such intelligence activity.

(3) The number of full-time contractor employees (or the equivalent of full-time in the case of part-time contractor employees) funded to perform or in support of each such intelligence activity.

(4) A determination as to whether each such intelligence activity is predominantly in support of national intelligence or departmental missions.

(5) The total number of analysts of the Intelligence Enterprise of the Department that perform—

- (A) strategic analysis; or
- (B) operational analysis.

(b) **FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY REPORT.**—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that—

(1) examines the feasibility and advisability of including the budget request for all intelligence activities of each intelligence component of the Department that predominantly support departmental missions, as designated by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, in the Homeland Security Intelligence Program; and

(2) includes a plan to enhance the coordination of department-wide intelligence activities to achieve greater efficiencies in the performance of the Department of Homeland Security intelligence functions.

(c) **INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT OF THE DEPARTMENT.**—In this section, the term “intelligence component of the Department” has the meaning given that term in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).

SEC. 325. REPORT ON POLITICAL PRISON CAMPS IN NORTH KOREA.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on political prison camps in North Korea.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall—

(1) describe the actions the United States is taking to support implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the eventual establishment of a tribunal to hold individuals accountable for abuses; and

(2) include, with respect to each political prisoner camp in North Korea to the extent information is available—

(A) the estimated prisoner population of each such camp;

(B) the geographical coordinates of each such camp;

(C) the reasons for confinement of the prisoners at each such camp;

(D) a description of the primary industries and products made at each such camp, and the end users of any goods produced in such camp;

(E) information regarding involvement of any non-North Korean entity or individual involved in the operations of each such camp, including as an end user or source of any good or products used in, or produced by, in such camp;

(F) information identifying individuals and agencies responsible for conditions in each such camp at all levels of the Government of North Korea;

(G) a description of the conditions under which prisoners are confined, with respect to the adequacy of food, shelter, medical care, working conditions, and reports of ill-treatment of prisoners, at each such camp; and

(H) unclassified imagery, including satellite imagery, of each such camp.

(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form and may include a classified annex if necessary.

SEC. 326. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY OF DOMESTIC OIL REFINERIES AND RELATED RAIL TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) ASSESSMENT.—The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall conduct an intelligence assessment of the security of domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure.

(b) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—

(1) the results of the assessment required under subsection (a); and

(2) any recommendations with respect to intelligence sharing or intelligence collection to improve the security of domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure to protect the communities surrounding such refineries or such infrastructure from potential harm that the Under Secretary considers appropriate.

SEC. 327. ENHANCED CONTRACTOR LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 506B(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3098(c)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (11), by striking “or contracted”;

(2) by redesignating paragraph (12) as paragraph (13); and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (11) the following:

“(12) The best estimate of the number of intelligence collectors and analysts contracted by each element of the intelligence community and a description of the functions performed by such contractors.”.

SEC. 328. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICACY OF MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING TO FACILITATE INTELLIGENCE SHARING.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Pro-

gram Manager of the Information Sharing Environment, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives an assessment of the efficacy of the memoranda of understanding signed between Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies to facilitate intelligence-sharing within and separate from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Such assessment shall include—

(1) any language within such memoranda of understanding that prohibited or may be construed to prohibit intelligence-sharing between Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies; and

(2) any recommendations for memoranda of understanding to better facilitate intelligence-sharing between Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies.

SEC. 329. REPORT ON FOREIGN MAN-MADE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE WEAPONS.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the threat posed by man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States interests through 2025, including threats from foreign countries and foreign non-State actors.

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 330. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY TO DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT AL-QAEDA AND ITS AFFILIATED OR ASSOCIATED GROUPS.

(a) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a comprehensive report on the United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.

(2) COORDINATION.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other department or agency of the United States Government that has responsibility for activities directed at combating al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.

(3) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A definition of—

(i) al-Qaeda core, including a list of which known individuals constitute al-Qaeda core;

(ii) an affiliated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an affiliate group of al-Qaeda;

(iii) an associated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an associated group of al-Qaeda; and

(iv) a group aligned with al-Qaeda, including a description of what actions a group takes or statements it makes that qualify it as a group aligned with al-Qaeda.

(B) A list of any other group, including the organization that calls itself the Islamic State (also known as “ISIS” or “ISIL”), that adheres to the core mission of al-Qaeda, or who espouses the same violent jihad ideology as al-Qaeda.

(C) An assessment of the relationship between al-Qaeda core and the groups referred to in subparagraph (B).

(D) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of al-Qaeda and the groups referred to in subparagraph (B) from January 1, 2010, to

the present, including a description of the metrics that are used to assess strengthening or weakening and an assessment of the relative increase or decrease in violent attacks attributed to such entities.

(E) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a member of al-Qaeda core if such individual is not located in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

(F) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a member of al-Qaeda core as well as a member of a group referred to in subparagraph (B).

(G) A definition of defeat of core al-Qaeda.

(H) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command, and control between core al-Qaeda and the groups referred to in subparagraph (B), specifically addressing each such group.

(I) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations against core al-Qaeda and the groups referred to in subparagraph (B), and whether such operations have had a sustained impact on the capabilities and effectiveness of core al-Qaeda and such groups.

(4) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 331. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON RETRAINING VETERANS IN CYBERSECURITY.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to Congress a feasibility study on retraining veterans and retired members of elements of the intelligence community in cybersecurity.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. ROGERS) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RUPPERSBERGER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 4681.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the RECORD at the end of my remarks the Joint Explanatory Statement prepared by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.

Mr. Speaker, when Mr. RUPPERSBERGER and I assumed the helm of the committee, we committed to return to the practice of passing the annual intelligence authorization bill, recognizing that it is one of the most critical tools that Congress has to control the intelligence activities of the

United States Government. I am proud today that we are bringing the fifth such authorization bill to the floor since Mr. RUPPERSBERGER assumed the role of ranking member and I assumed the role of chairman 4 years ago.

As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, the bulk of the committee's direction is found in the classified annex to the bill, which is very similar to the version passed by the House earlier this year.

At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex increases the President's budget request by less than 1 percent and is consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act funding caps. Key committee funding initiatives, vital to national security, are preserved in this bill. These funding initiatives are offset by reductions to unnecessary programs and increased efficiencies.

The bill's modest net increase reflects the committee's concern that the President's request does not properly fund a number of important initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls when it comes to the matters of national security. The bill also provides substantial intelligence resources to help defeat Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

Earlier this year, the House passed its version of this bill with overwhelming bipartisan support. This bill contains all of the provisions that were not previously enacted into law in the fiscal year 2014 bill, along with provisions added by the Senate. None of these provisions are considered controversial, and we have worked through and vetted to make sure that is accurate with both Republican and Democrat staff and Members.

Mr. Speaker, we find ourselves in a very interesting time in history. ISIL is attempting to build a state across the Middle East, from Lebanon to Iraq, including Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The group already controls a swath of land across Iraq and Syria about the size of the State of Indiana, and it is growing. The goal of our counterterrorism strategy is to deny safe haven from which terrorists can plot attacks against the United States and/or our allies. Regrettably, we have not prevented ISIL from establishing such a safe haven, and, as a result, we face a growing threat from that region.

At the same time, state actors like Russia and China view this time as an opportunity to expand their reach and expand their influence. Uneven leadership in recent years has emboldened these adversaries to change the international order, at the expense of U.S. interests.

We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policymakers with the best and most timely information possible on the threats we face. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train, plan, and fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that steal American jobs through theft of intellectual property. We ask them

to track nuclear and missile threats. We demand they get it right every time.

This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our intelligence community have the funding and authorities and support that they need to meet their mission and to keep us safe.

I take this moment, Mr. Speaker, at a time when certainly voices both around the country and around the world are seeking to condemn the very courageous men and women who show up in the intelligence business to provide the information to keep America safe. They are silent warriors. They are faithful patriots. They don't ask for recognition. They don't ask for time. You don't see their names in the front pages of the paper or on TV. They really don't seek that recognition.

But they seek the very purpose of being the first to be able to develop that one piece of information that might prevent further conflict, it might prevent a terrorist attack, it might prevent a nuclear launch, it might prevent one Nation from attacking another.

In the haze of what seems to be self-loathing these days, by targeting that against these very courageous men and women who cannot defend themselves in public, we are doing a disservice to their courage and their commitment to keep America safe. We find that it is easy to, at some point, go back and point fingers at what we believe may or may not have happened in the work of keeping America safe. It is realistically and holistically unfair that we would do that to these very brave souls who risk their lives today.

But here is the good news for Americans. These folks that work in the shadows understand that they have accepted these dangerous and quiet roles, and they will get up this morning, like they have every other morning, and understand it is between them and the United States when it comes to any terrorist attack, or worse, bigger, broader conflict somewhere in the world.

So they will do their job; they will do their duty; they will do their mission. They will read the papers and fold them and put them on their desk and go about their work, their important work. But it is wrong that years later we ask these people to have to believe that they might have to get a lawyer to do their job.

The next time that America asks them to do something hard and difficult in defense of the United States, we shouldn't be giving them lawyers and subpoenas and the United Nations condemning their actions and looking for prosecutions in their effort to tear the United States down one more level. We ought to be giving them ticker tape parades when they come home from these places and say: Thank you for your sacrifice, and thank you for your family's sacrifice. We can sleep better at night knowing that you have had

the courage to stand where no other American was willing to stand in defense of the United States.

I hope they take this as certainly my final bill on this particular floor to encourage them to do their good work, to know that Americans who are kissing their kids and putting them on the bus this morning understand that it takes their efforts to keep this country safe, that somebody that shows up for work and is engaged in international commerce understands that it takes their work to keep America safe. Believe me, outside of this town, people across America understand the value and importance and really the essential work that these people do for the defense of America. We should not condemn them, we should be proud of their work, and we should stand behind them. This bill I think represents the work in a bipartisan way that allows them to continue that work, to do the work that protects America.

I would be remiss if I didn't thank my good friend DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER. Over the last 4 years, these five budgets could not have happened without your work and your staff's work in making sure that we had the best product available to make sure that the intelligence community had the resources that they need, the policies that they need, the support that they need, and, yes, every once in a while, the kick in the can that they needed.

With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, when DUTCH and I assumed the helm of the Committee, we committed to return to the practice of passing the annual intelligence authorization bill, recognizing that it is one of the most critical tools Congress has to control the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. I am proud today that we are bringing the fifth such authorization bill to the floor since I assumed the Chairmanship four years ago.

As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, the bulk of the Committee's direction is found in the classified annex to the bill, which is very similar to the version passed by the House earlier this year.

At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex increases the President's budget request by less than one percent and is consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act funding caps. Key Committee funding initiatives, vital to national security, are preserved in this bill. These funding initiatives are offset by reductions to unnecessary programs and increased efficiencies. The bill's modest net increase reflects the Committee's concern that the President's request does not properly fund a number of important initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls. The bill also provides substantial intelligence resources to help defeat ISIL.

Earlier this year the House passed its version of this bill by an overwhelming bipartisan vote. This bill contains all of those provisions that were not previously enacted into law in the FY 14 bill, along with provisions added by the Senate. None of those provisions are considered controversial.

Mr. Speaker, we find ourselves in a very interesting time in history. ISIL is attempting to

build a state across the Middle East—from Lebanon to Iraq, including Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The group already controls a swath of land across Iraq and Syria. The goal of our counterterrorism strategy is to deny safe haven from which terrorists can plot attacks against the United States and our allies. Regrettably, we have not prevented ISIL from establishing such a safe haven, and as a result we face a growing threat from the region.

At the same time, state actors like Russia and China view this time as an opportunity to expand their reach and influence. Uneven leadership in recent years has emboldened these adversaries to change the international order—at the expense of U.S. interests.

We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policy makers with the best and most timely information possible on the threats we face. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train, plan, and fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that steal American jobs. We ask them to track nuclear and missile threats. And we demand they get it right—every time.

This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our Intelligence Community have the funding and authorities—and support—they need to meet their mission and to keep us safe.

Before closing, I want to take a moment to thank the men and women of this country who serve in our Intelligence Community today. It has been a distinct honor to get to know so many of them, and I am proud to have played a role in contributing to their success.

I would also like to extend thanks to all of my dedicated staff on the Committee who worked hard over the years to get us back on track in passing the annual Authorization bill and in our daily oversight of the Intelligence Community.

Thank you to my current committee staff: Darren Dick, Katie Wheelbarger, Sarah Geffroy, Andy Keiser, Bryan Smith, Ashley Lowry, Susan Phalen, Tom Corcoran, Michael Ellis, Chelsey Campbell, Geof Kahn, Brooke Eisele, Randy Smith, Jim Hildebrand, Shannon Stuart, Rachel Wilson, Lisa Major, Diane Rinaldo. Thank you, as well as to those who are no longer with the staff but played an influential role in committee activities during my tenure as Chairman: Michael Allen, Chris Dones, Jamil Jaffer, Nathan Hauser, Todd Jones, Frank Garcia, George Pappas, Will Koella, Leah Scott, Fred Fleitz, and Stephanie Pelton.

Finally, a big thank you to our dedicated Security and Information Technology staff who keep us up and running everyday: Brandon Smith, Kristin Jepson and Kevin Klein.

JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015

The following consists of the explanatory material to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.

This joint explanatory statement shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.

This explanatory statement is accompanied by a classified annex that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the Act and has the legal status of public law.

The classified annex and classified Schedule of Authorizations are the result of nego-

tiations between the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to reconcile differences in their respective versions of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. The congressionally directed actions described in Senate Report No. 113-233, the classified annex that accompanied Senate Report No. 113-233, and the classified annex that accompanied House Report No. 113-463 should be carried out to the extent they are not amended, altered, substituted, or otherwise specifically addressed in either this Joint Explanatory Statement or in the classified annex to this Statement.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

The following is a section-by-section analysis and explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2015.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel levels by program for Fiscal Year 2015 are contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments

Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility to the DNI in managing the civilian personnel of the Intelligence Community (IC). Section 103 provides that the DNI may authorize employment of civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2015 in excess of the number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding three percent of the total limit applicable to each IC element under Section 102. The DNI may do so only if necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA for Fiscal Year 2015.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of \$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2015 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—GENERAL MATTERS

Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law

Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

Section 302 provides that the authorization of appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the con-

duct of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 303. National intelligence strategy

Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to require the DNI to develop a comprehensive national intelligence strategy every four years beginning in 2017.

Section 304. Software licensing

Section 304 amends Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947, which requires chief information officers within the IC to prepare biennial inventories and assessments concerning the use and procurement of software licenses, to make certain enhancements to the biennial assessments required under Section 109.

Section 305. Reporting of certain employment activities by former intelligence officers and employees

Section 305 requires the head of each element of the IC to issue regulations that require an employee occupying positions with access to particularly sensitive information within such element to sign a written agreement that requires the regular reporting of any employment by, representation of, or the provision of advice relating to national security to the government of a foreign country, or any person whose activities are supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized by any government of a foreign country, for a two-year period after the employee ceases employment with the IC element.

Section 306. Inclusion of Predominantly Black Institutions in intelligence officer training program

Section 306 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to include predominantly black institutions in the intelligence officer training programs established under Section 1024 of the Act.

Section 307. Management and oversight of financial intelligence

Section 307 requires the DNI to prepare a plan for management of the elements of the IC that carry out financial intelligence activities.

Section 308. Analysis of private sector policies and procedures for countering insider threats

Section 308 directs the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an analysis of private sector policies and procedures for countering insider threats.

Section 309. Procedures for the retention of incidentally acquired communications

Section 309 requires the head of each element of the IC to adopt Attorney General-approved procedures that govern the retention of nonpublic telephone or electronic communications acquired without consent of a person who is a party to the communications, including communications in electronic storage.

The procedures required under this section shall apply to any intelligence activity that is reasonably anticipated to result in the acquisition of such telephone or electronic communications to or from a United States person not otherwise authorized by court order, subpoena, or similar legal process, regardless of the location where the collection occurs. The procedures shall prohibit the retention of such telephone or electronic communications for a period in excess of five years, unless the communications are determined to fall within one of several categories, enumerated in subsection (b)(3)(B), for which retention in excess of five years is authorized, to include communications that have been affirmatively determined to constitute foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, communications that are reasonably

believed to constitute evidence of a crime and are retained by a law enforcement agency, and communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to have a secret meaning.

Because it may be necessary in certain instances for IC elements to retain communications covered by this section for a period in excess of five years that do not fall into the categories specifically enumerated in subsection (b)(3)(B), subsection (b)(3)(B)(vii) provides flexibility for the head of each element of the intelligence community to authorize such extended retention where the head of the element determines that it is necessary to protect the national security of the United States. In the absence of such a determination, Section 309 is intended to establish a default rule for intelligence collection activities, not otherwise authorized by legal process, that requires agencies to delete communications covered by this section after five years, unless a determination is made that the communications constitute foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or otherwise meet the retention requirements set forth in this section.

Section 310. Clarification of limitation of review to retaliatory security clearance or access determinations

Section 310 makes a technical amendment to Section 3001(b)(7) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to clarify that the policies and procedures prescribed by that section (to permit individuals to appeal adverse security clearance or access determinations) are only required to apply to adverse security clearance or access determinations alleged to be in reprisal for having made a protected whistleblower disclosure.

Section 311. Feasibility study on consolidating classified databases of cyber threat indicators and malware samples

Section 307 requires the DNI to conduct a feasibility study on consolidating classified databases of cyber threat indicators and malware samples in the IC and to provide a report to the congressional intelligence committees summarizing the feasibility study.

Section 312. Sense of Congress on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime cooperation with Ukraine

Section 312 expresses the sense of Congress concerning cybersecurity threat and cybercrime cooperation between the United States and Ukraine.

Section 313. Replacement of locally employed staff serving at United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation

Section 313 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that every supervisory position at a U.S. diplomatic facility in the Russian Federation is occupied by a citizen of the United States who has passed a background check and to provide Congress with a plan to further reduce reliance on locally employed staff.

Section 314. Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation and adjacent countries

Section 314 requires that each U.S. diplomatic facility that is constructed in, or undergoes a construction upgrade in, the Russian Federation, any country that shares a land border with the Russian Federation, or any country that is a former member of the Soviet Union, shall be constructed to include a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. The Secretary of State may waive the requirements of this section upon a determination that it is in the national security interest of the United States.

SUBTITLE B—REPORTING

Section 321. Report on declassification process

Section 321 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress describing proposals to improve the declassification process and steps the IC could take or legislation that may be necessary, to enable the National Declassification Center to better accomplish the missions assigned to the Center by Executive Order 13526.

Section 322. Report on intelligence community efficient spending targets

Section 322 requires the DNI to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees on the status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce administrative costs for the IC during the preceding year.

Section 323. Annual report on violations of law or executive order

Section 323 requires the DNI to report annually to the congressional intelligence committees on violations of law or executive order by personnel of an element of the IC that were identified during the previous calendar year. Under the National Security Act, the President is required to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States government. Nonetheless, this annual reporting requirement is necessary to ensure that the intelligence oversight committees of the House and Senate are made fully aware of violations of law or executive order, including, in particular, violations of Executive order 12333 for activities not otherwise subject to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Section 324. Annual report on intelligence activities of the Department of Homeland Security

Section 324 requires the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the DHS to provide the congressional intelligence committees with a report on each intelligence activity of each intelligence component of the Department that includes, among other things, the amount of funding requested, the number of full-time employees, and the number of full-time contractor employees. In addition, Section 324 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that examines the feasibility and advisability of consolidating the planning, programming, and resourcing of such activities within the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP).

The HSIP budget was established to fund those intelligence activities that principally support missions of the DHS separately from those of the NIP. To date, however, this mechanism has only been used to supplement the budget for the office of Intelligence and Analysis. It has not been used to fund the activities of the non-IC components in the DHS that conduct intelligence-related activities. As a result, there is no comprehensive reporting to Congress regarding the overall resources and personnel required in support of the Department's intelligence activities.

Section 325. Report on political prison camps in North Korea

Section 325 requires the DNI to submit a report on political prison camps in North Korea to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 326. Assessment of security of domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure

Section 326 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis to conduct an intelligence assessment of the security of domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure.

Section 327. Enhanced contractor level assessments for the intelligence community

Section 327 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to require that the annual personnel level assessments for the IC, required under Section 506B of the Act, include a separate estimate of the number of intelligence collectors and analysts contracted by each element of the IC and a description of the functions performed by such contractors.

Section 328. Assessment of the efficacy of memoranda of understanding to facilitate intelligence-sharing

Section 328 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis to provide appropriate congressional committees with an assessment of the efficacy of the memoranda of understanding signed between Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies to facilitate intelligence-sharing within and separate from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. This study should help identify any obstacles to intelligence sharing between agencies, particularly any obstacles that might have impeded intelligence sharing in the wake of the April 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon, and find improvements to existing intelligence sharing relationships.

Section 329. Report on foreign man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons

Section 329 requires the DNI to provide appropriate congressional committees with a report on the threat posed by manmade electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States interests through 2025.

Section 330. Report on United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups

Section 330 requires the DNI to provide appropriate congressional committees with a report on the United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.

Section 331. Feasibility study on retraining veterans in cybersecurity

Section 331 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a feasibility study on retraining veterans and retired members of elements of the IC in cybersecurity.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Chairman ROGERS, this is my last opportunity on the floor to thank you again for your leadership. It has, once again, produced a strong, bipartisan, and bicameral Intelligence Authorization Act.

Our committee believes that our Nation's security is too important to be a political football. We have had different views, we argue, but we work it out for the good of American people.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that your legacy of bipartisanship, hard work, rigorous oversight, and problem-solving continues and spreads throughout the Congress. It is amazing what we can accomplish when we work together to solve problems.

I also want to thank our counterparts in the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senators FEINSTEIN and CHAMBLISS, for working very closely with us and each member of our committee. On the Democratic side, I want to acknowledge all the hard work of Mr. THOMPSON—who is sitting here to my left—Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. LANGEVIN,

Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. GUTIÉRREZ, Mr. PAS-TOR, Mr. HIMES, and Ms. SEWELL. And I want to thank our staff and the dedicated men and women of the intelligence community who work every day and all night throughout the world to protect us. I do agree with the chairman's statements about those men and women throughout the world who are out there protecting us and putting their lives on the line.

Now, today, we look beyond this Congress. We come together to set the stage for the continuing oversight of intelligence programs, personnel, and dollars. By doing so, we reinforce to the American people, and to the world, that there are checks and balances. We reinforce that the tools we authorize are for the sole purpose of keeping us, our allies, and our partners safe.

In May, the House passed the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 by 345 votes to 19. The Senate, however, took up each year separately. Over the summer, this House passed the FY14 bill, which the President signed.

So, we now take up the FY15 bill, which the Senate amended and sent back to us. This amended bill largely mirrors the relevant portions of the House-passed combined bill.

Passing a detailed Intelligence Authorization Act ensures that our intelligence agencies spend money only on programs Congress is informed of, approves, and can continuously oversee.

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Oversight is extremely important. It helps to make sure that everything our intelligence agencies do follows the Constitution and the laws of the United States and maximizes the civil liberties and privacy of Americans. At the same time, the intelligence agencies need the clear authorization, direction, and guidance from Congress to do their vital work to protect and defend America, its allies, and its partners.

The Intelligence Authorization Act is split into four parts: the unclassified legislative text; the unclassified report; the classified annex, which explains our intent for the classified aspects of the bill; and the classified schedule of authorizations.

While we have made cuts to certain areas and added money in others to produce a responsible, well thought out, and fiscally prudent budget, the budget for fiscal year 2015 slightly exceeds the President's request.

While over the last 4 years we have reduced the intelligence community's budget by over a billion dollars, this year's bill acknowledges the need to make corrections after the drastic cuts of sequestration and the Budget Control Act.

Additionally, this bill acknowledges the need to step up our intelligence efforts to counter evolving threats such as ISIL. It is a dangerous world out there, and our bill accounts for that.

Let me also mention some specifics in the bill. First, it continues to em-

phasize the value of our space programs and endorses aggressive action to decrease our reliance on Russian-made engines to launch our national security satellites.

Two, it makes investments into research and development to defend against next generation threats and to stay ahead of countries like China and Russia. Three, it further improves the continuous evaluation of insider threats while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties.

Next, it enables better intelligence and information sharing to prevent foreign fighters coming in and out of Syria. It also enables cutting-edge Defense Intelligence Agency technology. We must stay ahead of the curve in technology.

The bill also further refines the Department of Defense human intelligence capabilities while supporting communitywide human intelligence efforts to better understand the enemies' plans and intentions. It also establishes increased accountability measures for our most sensitive programs.

The committee has worked with the intelligence community and the Senate to produce this solid, bipartisan bill. This bill also incorporates the valuable floor amendments the House passed in May. It represents a culmination of our committee's work through extensive hearings and briefings, travel, and in-depth studies. The bill is strong, and I am proud to support it.

For the sake of keeping the country, its allies, and partners safe and for the sake of thoroughly overseeing even the most classified intelligence programs, I urge my colleagues to pass the bill today.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I thought I would take a moment to extend my thanks to all the dedicated staff on the committee, certainly from the Republican side and to the Democrats as well, who worked hard over the years to get us back on track in passing this annual authorization bill in our daily oversight of the intelligence community.

If you will indulge me, Mr. Speaker, thank you to my current committee staff: Darren Dick, Katie Wheelbarger, Sarah Geffroy, Andy Keiser, Bryan Smith, Ashley Lowry, Susan Phalen, Tom Corcoran, Michael Ellis, Chelsey Campbell, Geof Kahn, Brooke Eisele, Randy Smith, Jim Hildebrand, Shannon Stuart, Rachel Wilson, Lisa Major, and Diane Rinaldo.

Thank you as well to staff who have played an influential role in the committee activities during my tenure as chairman in reengaging this as a force for oversight in the Intelligence Committee: Michael Allen, Chris Donesa, Jamil Jaffer, Nathan Hauser, Todd Jones, Frank Garcia, George Pappas, Will Koella, Leah Scott, Fred Fleitz, and Stephanie Pelton.

Finally, a big thank you to our dedicated security and information technology staff, by the way, who have done well to beat back the hordes of our nation state actors who, for some reason, Mr. Speaker, took a good interest in what we were doing in that classified space, and they kept us up and running every single day: Brandon Smith, Kristin Jepson, and Kevin Klein.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. THOMPSON), a great member of our committee who specialized in infrastructure and also worked very hard to make sure that our Embassies have the intelligence information they need to protect themselves.

Mr. THOMPSON of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding and for all the good work you did on the committee as the ranking member. I also want to thank Chairman ROGERS for the good work that he did as the chairman.

Working together, he was very accommodating and allowed all of us to be able to address specific issues that were of concern to us and regarding the security of our great Nation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are going to miss you.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the passage of this bill. This bill will provide greater national security for our country and the people that we all represent.

The bill contains two important provisions that I authored that protect our communities at home and diplomatic facilities abroad.

My district is home to several oil refineries, employing thousands of people, providing well-paying, good, middle class jobs, and are a key part of our regional economy.

As domestic oil production continues to increase in the region, I have heard from several of my constituents and my local governments about their growing concern regarding the security of the shipment and storage of crude oil and subsequent refined products. I believe we have the responsibility to protect our workers, our domestic refineries, and our communities from potential threats.

Included in this bill is a provision that directs the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis to conduct an assessment of the security of our Nation's oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure. It directs the office to make recommendations on how to improve intelligence collection and sharing of information to better protect those facilities in the surrounding communities from any harm.

Additionally, studies conducted in response to the terrible 2012 attack on Benghazi identified the need for security personnel at U.S. diplomatic posts to receive threat information in a more timely manner.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. THOMPSON of California. In response to this need, this bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide an assessment of the status of threat information sharing between the intelligence community and diplomatic security personnel and to propose actions to help make sure security personnel at U.S. Embassies are better able to request and receive security enhancements in a timely manner.

By making sure our intelligence community is taking concerns seriously and sharing the necessary information, we can better assess and mitigate threats and increase security at home and abroad and make our country safer.

I urge my colleagues to join me in passing this good piece of legislation.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California, Mr. ADAM SCHIFF, a great member of our committee with a tremendous work ethic. He reads almost every piece of intelligence information and comes to quality and informed conclusions.

He also has focused a lot and specialized in working with legislation involving transparency and accountability and has spent a lot of time on an area that is very important to our Intelligence Committee, the space program.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I want to join my colleagues in urging the House to support the 2015 Intelligence Authorization Act which has now returned to us from the Senate, but before I address the substance of the bill, I would like to congratulate Chairman ROGERS and Ranking Member RUPPERSBERGER for their extraordinary efforts to get this bill passed and to the President.

As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I know how hard they and the staff have worked to make this happen, and I would especially like to congratulate Chairman ROGERS and wish him well as he prepares to leave the House at the end of the year. It has been a great pleasure working with you, and I wish you all the very best.

These are challenging days for America's intelligence officers and analysts. As ISIS continues to threaten the Middle East; as Russia's "little green men" continue to coordinate attacks on the Ukrainian Government; as North Korea's young, isolated, and often dangerously erratic leader continues his behavior; and as the international community continues its efforts to secure Iran's agreement to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and infrastructure, our intelligence professionals play a vital role in keeping us safe and secure.

Developing and maintaining actionable intelligence on ISIS is of particular urgency. While the intelligence community has been following ISIS' growth for some time, the group's takeover of a large swath of Syria and Iraq has made it a top intelligence priority.

If we are to be effective in partnering with regional allies to degrade and destroy ISIS, we need to be able to develop the very best intelligence and accurate ground truth. That takes time, and it takes assets—on the ground, in the air, in space—to collect information. It also takes the world class analysts of our intelligence community to turn that information into recommendations for policymakers.

We must also remain focused on Russian efforts to destabilize its neighbors, particularly Ukraine, but also the Baltic States. Our intelligence community has given us insight into Russian involvement in these efforts and into the events that led to the tragic downing of the Malaysian airliner last summer.

The bill also prioritizes vital efforts at nonproliferation and will help give us the tools that we need to assess events on the ground in North Korea and Iran and wherever there is a threat of WMD.

These are but a few of the important matters covered in the Intelligence Authorization bill. As a member of the committee who has been proud to work closely with both the chair and ranking member, I am confident it supports our intelligence professionals while providing oversight that is so critical to the proper functioning of our intelligence agencies.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, I urge my colleagues to vote for this important bipartisan and bicameral bill. It is the single most effective oversight tool we have, and it ensures that our intelligence community has what it needs to keep us and our allies safe. Intelligence is often the first line of defense against a dangerous world. Without it, we are in the dark, and we are vulnerable.

Finally, once again, let me just say thank you to my good friend, Mr. Chairman, and to the members of the committee, to our colleagues in the Senate, and to the men and women of the intelligence community. It has been my honor and privilege to work with you under your great leadership during the 113th Congress.

I also want to thank the Republican and Democratic staffs for working together. That is what makes it work. You are only as good as your team and your staff.

I also would like to acknowledge the Democratic staff: Staff Director Heather Molino, Amanda Rogers-Thorpe, Bob Minehart, Linda Cohen, Carly Blake,

Allison Getty, Deb Haynie, and Michael Bahar.

I also thank staff members who were with us but have retired: Mike Shank, Janet Fisher, and Khizer Sayed.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, again, I want to thank my friends on the other side of the aisle, from Dutch to Heather, and the whole entire team for putting this product together by putting our country first. It is very important.

I challenge every Member to read this material next year when it is announced that you can review the classified annex. Review the classified annex. I think they will have a better perspective at the huge number of challenges facing the United States when it comes to real threats developing around the world.

Mr. Speaker, I would again say thanks to all, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to support the Intelligence Authorization Act. As a member of the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, I know these Authorization bills provide the necessary accountability, direction, and resources for those who keep our nation safe.

Today's bill reflects the continuation of the Committee's bipartisan and bicameral work, and I want to thank Chairman ROGERS and Ranking Member RUPPERSBERGER for their strong and consistent leadership on these critical issues.

Today I want to highlight two areas of specific interest to me.

First, this legislation strikes a careful balance between ensuring that our nation's secrets are kept safe and providing appropriate transparency with the American people. There are lawful ways to raise concerns of wrongdoing and procedures to declassify information when appropriate. In the past, Congress has strengthened these avenues, including by enhancing whistleblower protections and the role of Inspectors General.

As it has each year, this bill adds to the mission of counterintelligence to ensure that information is protected and that the tools utilized by security professionals are handled lawfully and with full consideration for the privacy and civil liberties of our intelligence professionals. This bill continues this important direction, asking the DNI to establish appropriate guidelines to govern how publicly available information can be utilized.

Second, this bill continues to support the work of the men and women at the front lines of cybersecurity. It helps cyber professionals at NSA, FBI, and DHS to hone their tools and skills to protect us, while supporting initiatives to grow the next-generation cyber workforce. And it will further aid the Intelligence Community in understanding and defending certain networks from cyber threats.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud of our work on this bill, and I urge its passage.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. ROGERS) that the House suspend the

rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, H.R. 4681.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

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PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF S. 2244, TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2014; PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF MOTIONS TO SUSPEND THE RULES; AND PROVIDING FOR PROCEEDINGS DURING THE PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 12, 2014, THROUGH JANUARY 3, 2015

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 775 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 775

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (S. 2244) to extend the termination date of the Terrorism Insurance Program established under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, and for other purposes. All points of order against consideration of the bill are waived. The amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution shall be considered as adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be considered as read. All points of order against provisions in the bill, as amended, are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, and on any further amendment thereto, to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Financial Services; and (2) one motion to commit with or without instructions.

SEC. 2. It shall be in order at any time on the legislative day of December 11, 2014, for the Speaker to entertain motions that the House suspend the rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV. The Speaker or his designee shall consult with the Minority Leader or her designee on the designation of any matter for consideration pursuant to this section.

SEC. 3. On any legislative day of the second session of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress after December 11, 2014—

(a) the Journal of the proceedings of the previous day shall be considered as approved; and

(b) the Chair may at any time declare the House adjourned to meet at a date and time, within the limits of clause 4, section 5, article I of the Constitution, to be announced by the Chair in declaring the adjournment.

SEC. 4. The Speaker may appoint Members to perform the duties of the Chair for the duration of the period addressed by section 3 of this resolution as though under clause 8(a) of rule I.

SEC. 5. Each day during the period addressed by section 3 of this resolution shall

not constitute a calendar day for purposes of section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546).

SEC. 6. Each day during the period addressed by section 3 of this resolution shall not constitute a legislative day for purposes of clause 7 of rule XIII.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. HASTINGS), my dear friend, pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, today the House of Representatives is considering a rule for consideration of a bill to reauthorize the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, or a program known as TRIA. Without this bill, TRIA is set to expire on December 31, meaning that the House and the Senate must now act or the program will end at the end of this year.

Since TRIA was signed into law in 2002, it has served as an effective means of dealing with the problem of availability of terrorism insurance. TRIA has enabled the private insurance market to provide an essential type of coverage that otherwise may not exist.

However, like many other government programs, TRIA needs to be looked at and reformed in order to serve its original purpose, and that is why we are here today, Mr. Speaker.

Thanks to the leadership of Chairman JEB HENSARLING and Vice Chairman RANDY NEUGEBAUER of the Financial Services Committee, S. 2244 provides for many of those necessary reforms that will protect taxpayers, promote market stability, and provide for economic security for the American people, all in one, brand-new package.

What we are doing here today is important and essential for many people, but it is here to maintain the stability of a marketplace.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to take us back to 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. None of us will ever forget where we were when we first heard and saw of the terrorist attacks that attacked our homeland in New York City, at the Pentagon, and in a field in Pennsylvania. The accompanying stories of heroism and the deeds by Americans and others were simply heroism at its finest at a time of attack on this country.

What some might not remember, though, is the remarkable amount of economic uncertainty and damage that

was caused to America and in the following weeks and months after 9/11. While we mourned the loss of many loved ones, our economy was shaken to its core.

Those attacks created and caused \$32.5 billion in losses, approximately \$20 billion of which were incurred by insurance companies. A second similar attack would have left the U.S. insurance economy insolvent, which in turn, being insolvent, would have undermined our entire economic structure of the free enterprise system. That is why TRIA was pressed into law, to provide a Federal backstop to avoid an immediate terrorism risk insurance crisis.

Sadly, terrorism has continued to be an ongoing threat to our Nation and, for the foreseeable future, I think that we need to remain vigilant and prepared for those consequences. So the cost of terrorism still looms large, and acts of terrorism are uninsurable risks that could sink our insurance markets without this new, updated program.

In this way, TRIA is a vital economic piece of our Nation's comprehensive security strategy because it allows for the American economy to recover more quickly in the event of an attack. I believe it does more than that. I believe it puts in place building blocks for us to understand responsibility, economic security, and how we would build back based upon rule of law and understanding about what would happen at a time of chaos.

TRIA provides certainty, certainty to our marketplace, by giving policyholders and insurers the tools that they need to understand and to develop a market-based solution to the economic threat that could be posed by terrorism. It gives policyholders and insurance providers the opportunity to model risk and to diversify their exposure with an understanding of what the law would provide.

I am encouraged by the reforms championed by, yesterday, up in the Rules Committee, Chairman JEB HENSARLING from the Fifth Congressional District of Texas, who has placed many of these new items directly into the bill as a result of hard negotiation.

These are called reforms, Mr. Speaker, and three reforms stand out to me as being particularly important.

First, section 102. It would decrease the Federal share of losses under the program by 1 percentage point annually until it equals 80 percent. That means that the Federal taxpayers will be responsible for less of the initial costs incurred after a terrorist attack than under the current law.

Second, section 103. 103 would increase the program trigger to \$200 million in \$20 million increments over 5 years. This means that TRIA would not kick in, the government program would not kick in until there was \$200 million in insurable losses following an attack, ensuring that the government would not only get involved if an attack had a massive impact, but we would know the rules ahead of time.