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To enhance the effectiveness of United States diplomatic efforts with respect to Iran by expanding economic sanctions against Iran to include refined petroleum, require the Secretary of Defense to develop and maintain viable military options to prevent the successful development or deployment of a nuclear weapons capability by the Government of Iran, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 15, 2009

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, Armed Services, Ways and Means, and Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To enhance the effectiveness of United States diplomatic efforts with respect to Iran by expanding economic sanctions against Iran to include refined petroleum, require the Secretary of Defense to develop and maintain viable military options to prevent the successful development or deployment of a nuclear weapons capability by the Government of Iran, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Peace Through
3 Strength Act of 2009”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 (a) **IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.**—Congress
6 finds the following:

7 (1) On October 25, 2007, the Secretary of the
8 Treasury designated under Executive Order 13224
9 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to designating and
10 blocking assets of foreign individuals and entities
11 that commit, or pose a significant risk of commit-
12 ting, acts of terrorism) the Islamic Revolutionary
13 Guard Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force for providing ma-
14 terial support to the Taliban and other terrorist or-
15 ganization and Iran’s state-owned Back Saderat as
16 a terrorist financier.

17 (2) In the 2008 Department of State Country
18 Report, the Secretary of State determined that of all
19 state sponsors of terrorism, the Government of Iran
20 is the most active sponsor of terrorism, threatening
21 peace in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

22 (3) According to the State Department, despite
23 its pledge to support the stabilization of Iraq, the
24 Government of Iran continues to provide lethal sup-
25 port, including weapons, training, funding, and guid-

1 ance, to Iraqi militant groups that target Coalition
2 and Iraqi forces and kill innocent Iraqi civilians.

3 (4) Iranian-produced advanced rockets, sniper
4 rifles, automatic weapons, explosively formed
5 penetrators, and mortars have killed Iraqi and Coali-
6 tion Forces as well as civilians.

7 (5) Iran has aided and abetted groups certified
8 by the United States Government as foreign ter-
9 rorist organizations for nearly 3 decades, including
10 Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Is-
11 lamic Jihad.

12 (6) In April 2008 the Commanding General
13 Multi-National Force-Iraq, General David H.
14 Petraeus, testified before the Committee on Armed
15 Services of the House of Representatives that Iran
16 has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging
17 way, through its lethal support to the “special
18 groups” operating against coalition forces in Iraq.

19 (7) United States Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan C.
20 Crocker, testified in April 2008 that Iran continues
21 to undermine the efforts of the Government of Iraq
22 to establish a stable, secure state by training crimi-
23 nal militia elements engaged in violence against
24 Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civil-
25 ians.

1 (8) The Director of the Central Intelligence
2 Agency, General Michael V. Hayden, stated on May
3 30, 2008, that “It is the policy of the Iranian gov-
4 ernment, approved at the highest levels of that gov-
5 ernment, to facilitate the killing of American and
6 other coalition forces in Iraq. Period.”.

7 (9) The Director of Defense Intelligence Agen-
8 cy, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, stated in
9 his March 10, 2009, testimony before the Senate
10 Armed Services Committee, “Iran continues to pro-
11 vide money, weapons and training to some Iraqi
12 Shia militants despite pledges by senior Iranian offi-
13 cials to stop such support. The weapons include Ex-
14 plosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) with radio-
15 controlled, remote arming and passive infrared deto-
16 nators, mortars, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades
17 and launchers, small arms ammunition and explo-
18 sives.”.

19 (b) IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE FLEET DEVELOP-
20 MENTS AND TESTING.—Congress finds the following:

21 (1) The Government of Iran continues to en-
22 hance the capabilities of its ballistic missile fleet,
23 holding United States interest in Southern Europe,
24 the Persian Gulf region, and South Asia at risk of
25 an attack.

1 (2) In September 2004, the Government of Iran
2 showed off its range of ballistic missiles at an an-
3 nual military parade, with the rockets draped in
4 banners vowing to “crush America” and “wipe Israel
5 off the map”.

6 (3) On October 25, 2007, the Secretary of
7 State designated under Executive Order 13382 (50
8 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of
9 weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their
10 supporters) two key Iranian entities of missile pro-
11 liferation concern, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
12 Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Defense and
13 Armed Forces Logistics. In addition, the Secretary
14 of the Treasury designated under Executive Order
15 13382 for proliferation activities nine IRGC-affili-
16 ated entities and five IRGC-affiliated individuals as
17 derivatives of the IRGC, Iran’s state-owned Banks
18 Melli and Mellat, and three individuals affiliated
19 with Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization.

20 (4) The IRGC has been outspoken about its
21 willingness to proliferate ballistic missiles capable of
22 carrying weapons of mass destruction.

23 (5) The IRGC’s ballistic missile inventory in-
24 cludes missiles which could be modified to deliver
25 weapons of mass destruction. The IRGC is one of

1 the primary organizations of the Iranian regime tied
2 to developing and testing the Shahab-3 missile. The
3 IRGC attempted, as recently as 2006, to procure so-
4 phisticated and costly equipment that could be used
5 to support Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear pro-
6 grams.

7 (6) Iranian Defense Minister, Brigadier General
8 Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, has stated that one of
9 the major projects of the Iranian Ministry of De-
10 fense and Armed Forces Logistics is the manufac-
11 turing of Shahab-3 missiles, and that this project
12 will not be halted.

13 (7) Michael McConnell, then Director of Na-
14 tional Intelligence, stated before the Senate Armed
15 Services Committee February 27, 2009, "Iran con-
16 tinues to deploy ballistic missiles inherently capable
17 of delivering nuclear weapons, and to develop longer-
18 range missiles. I note again that two activities rel-
19 evant to a nuclear weapons capability continue: ura-
20 nium enrichment that will enable the production of
21 fissile material and development of long-range bal-
22 listic missile systems."

23 (8) Iran test-fired nine long-range and medium
24 range missiles on July 9, 2008, and according to

1 Iranian state television, one of the missile systems
2 was the Shahab-3, capable of striking Israel.

3 (9) Iran currently possesses short-range bal-
4 listic missiles (SRBM), as well as medium-range bal-
5 listic missiles (MRBM), capable of reaching much of
6 the Middle East region, including Israel, and reach-
7 ing Turkey.

8 (10) On April 5, 2009, the President Barack
9 Obama said, “So let me be clear: Iran’s nuclear and
10 ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just
11 to the United States, but to Iran’s neighbors and
12 our allies.”.

13 (11) On February 3, 2009, the Government of
14 Iran successfully launched its first satellite into
15 orbit—an act in direct violation of United Nations
16 Security Council Resolution 1737, limiting Iran from
17 missile activity.

18 (12) Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of Na-
19 tional Intelligence, stated before the Senate Armed
20 Services Committee in March 2009, “Space launch
21 technology is no different from military technology,
22 and the Safir launch last month shows that Iran is
23 mastering the use of ballistic weapons.”.

24 (13) Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of Na-
25 tional Intelligence, stated before the Senate Armed

1 Services Committee in March 2009, “Militarily, Iran
2 continues to strengthen the three pillars of its stra-
3 tegic deterrence: surface-to-surface missiles, long-
4 range rockets and aircraft for retaliation; naval
5 forces to disrupt maritime traffic through key water-
6 ways; and unconventional forces and surrogates to
7 conduct worldwide lethal operations. Although many
8 of their statements are exaggerations, Iranian offi-
9 cials throughout the past year have repeatedly
10 claimed both greater ballistic missile capabilities that
11 could threaten United States and allied interests.”.

12 (14) General Michael Maples, Director of the
13 Defense Intelligence Agency stated before the Senate
14 Armed Services Committee in March 2009, “Iran’s
15 February 3, 2009, launch of the Safir space launch
16 vehicle shows progress in mastering technology need-
17 ed to produce ICBMs.”.

18 (15) On May 19, 2009, the Government of Iran
19 test-fired a new two-stage, medium-range, solid fuel,
20 surface-to-surface missile, claiming it can span the
21 entire nation of Israel and United States forces de-
22 ployed in the Persian Gulf Region.

23 (c) IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.—Congress finds the
24 following:

1 (1) An Iranian Government armed with nuclear
2 weapons would be significantly destabilizing to the
3 Middle East region, placing United States interests
4 at grave risk, and inspiring regional proliferation to
5 counter-balance an Iranian nuclear-strike capability.

6 (2) An Iranian Government equipped with nu-
7 clear weapons could have a far greater ability to
8 quash domestic dissent with little fear of national
9 intervention, hereby dimming prospects for internal
10 democratic transformation within Iran.

11 (3) The Government of Iran is actively devel-
12 oping the means to indigenously produce enriched
13 uranium, a necessary element to develop a nuclear
14 weapons capability, and has resisted international
15 calls for transparency and accountability measures
16 that would build confidence in the proclaimed peace-
17 ful intent of Iran's nuclear program.

18 (4) On February 5, 2008, the Director of Na-
19 tional Intelligence testified before the Select Com-
20 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate that "Declared
21 uranium enrichment efforts, which will enable the
22 production of fissile material, continue. This is the
23 most difficult challenge in nuclear production. Iran's
24 efforts to perfect ballistic missiles that can reach
25 North Africa and Europe also continue."

1 (5) In March 2009 Secretary of State Hillary
2 Clinton, in referring to United States allies, the
3 Czech Republic and Poland, said “They recognize
4 there is a real potential future threat, that missiles
5 not only with a nuclear warhead, but with a conven-
6 tional warhead or some other chemical or biological
7 weapon could very well be in the hands of a regime
8 like Iran’s, which we know will use whatever advan-
9 tage they have to intimidate as far as they think
10 their voice can reach.”.

11 (6) On April 6, 2009, the President Barack
12 Obama stated, “The peace of the region will also be
13 advanced if Iran forgoes any nuclear weapons ambi-
14 tions.”.

15 (7) According to Israeli Defense estimates,
16 Tehran is believed to currently have an arsenal of
17 100–200 long-range Shahab missiles that have a
18 range of up to 2,000 kilometers and carry up to one-
19 ton warheads.

20 (8) According to Israeli Defense estimates, it is
21 the Government of Iran’s plan to obtain 500 missile
22 launchers and over 1,000 missiles with a range of
23 2,500 km by 2015.

24 (9) On May 18, 2009, the President Barack
25 Obama claimed, “the Islamic Republic’s obtaining a

1 nuclear weapon would be not only a threat to Israel
2 and the United States, but ‘profoundly destabilizing’
3 to the international community in general”.

4 (10) On May 18, 2009, while meeting with the
5 President Barack Obama, Israeli Prime Minister
6 Benyamin Netanyahu said, “[A nuclear Iran] could
7 give the nuclear umbrella to terrorists or worse, it
8 could actually give nuclear weapons to terrorists I
9 believe it would put all of us in great peril.” Iran’s
10 obtaining nuclear weapons would be an existential
11 threat not only to Israel but the rest of the world.

12 (11) According to the IAEA, Iran has installed
13 2 or 3 types of next-generation centrifuges at
14 Natanz FEP, including IR-2 and the IR-3.

15 (12) On March 17, 2009, British Prime Min-
16 ister Gordon Brown states, “[L]et me be equally
17 clear that Iran’s current nuclear program is unac-
18 ceptable. Iran has concealed nuclear activities, re-
19 fused to cooperate with the IAEA, and flouted
20 United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Its re-
21 fusal to play by the rules leads us to view its nuclear
22 program as a critical proliferation threat. Iran there-
23 fore faces a clear choice—continue in this way and
24 face further and tougher sanctions, or change to a
25 United Nations overseen civil nuclear energy pro-

1 gram that will bring the greatest benefits to its citi-
2 zens.”.

3 (13) An International Atomic Energy Agency
4 (IAEA) report released on June 5, 2009, confirmed
5 that the number of centrifuges enriching uranium at
6 the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) has in-
7 creased to 4,920 (up from 3,936) with an additional
8 2,132 installed and operating under vacuum. This
9 brings the total number of centrifuges either enrich-
10 ing uranium or installed and ready to begin enrich-
11 ment to 7,052.

12 (14) On July 8, 2009, Chairman of the Joint
13 Chief of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen stated, the
14 “window is closing” for preventing Iran from acquir-
15 ing a nuclear weapon. He continues saying, “Iran is
16 very focused on developing this capability and the
17 clock is ticking and that’s why I’m as concerned as
18 I am.”.

19 (15) On September 25, 2009, it was announced
20 that Iran possessed a covert uranium enrichment fa-
21 cility along a road leading to the city of Qom.

22 (16) On September 30, 2009, Iran’s nuclear
23 chief Ali Akbar Salehi said, “The [Qom] facility was
24 built inside a mountain next to a military compound
25 of the Revolutionary Guard, and is equipped with air

1 defense systems.”. He openly expressed this will en-
2 sure continuity of its nuclear activities in case of an
3 attack.

4 (17) British Prime Minister Gordon Brown
5 commented on the Iranian nuclear facility at Qom
6 saying, “this is clear evidence of Iran’s serial decep-
7 tion. The size and configuration of this facility is in-
8 consistent with a peaceful programme. Iran is break-
9 ing rules that all nations must follow—endangering
10 the nonproliferation regime, denying its people ac-
11 cess to the opportunity they deserve, and threat-
12 ening the stability and security of the region and the
13 world.”.

14 (18) Prime Minister Netanyahu called Iran
15 “the major terrorist-sponsoring state of our time”.
16 He says, “that Tehran could give those nuclear
17 weapons to terrorists or give them a nuclear um-
18 brella that would bring terrorism beyond our wildest
19 dreams”.

20 (19) In September 2009, it was reported Iran
21 is helping to detect uranium deposits in Venezuela.
22 Iran’s Mining Minister Rodolfo Sanz said “Iran has
23 been assisting Venezuela with geophysical survey
24 flights and geochemical analysis of the deposits, and
25 that evaluations indicate the existence of uranium in

1 western parts of the country and in Santa Elena de
2 Uairen”. Sanz told reporters of this discovery, “We
3 could have important reserves of uranium.”.

4 (20) Department of State spokesman Ian Kelly
5 said recently that United States officials also have
6 “concerns” about a possible transfer of nuclear ma-
7 terials between Iran and Venezuela.

8 (d) U.S. THREAT OF ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
9 (EMP) ATTACK.—Congress finds the following:

10 (1) According to the EMP Commission, a single
11 nuclear weapon exploded at high altitude above the
12 United States will produce an electromagnetic pulse
13 (EMP).

14 (2) According to the EMP Commission, an
15 EMP attack would disrupt electrical power necessary
16 to support other critical infrastructures, including
17 supply and distribution of water, food, fuel, commu-
18 nications, transport, financial transactions, emer-
19 gency services, government services, and all other in-
20 frastructures supporting the national economy and
21 welfare. If significant parts of the electrical power
22 infrastructure are lost for any substantial period of
23 time, the Commission believes that the consequences
24 are likely to be catastrophic, and many people may
25 ultimately die for lack of the basic elements nec-

1 essary to sustain life in dense urban and suburban
2 communities.

3 (3) The EMP Commission stated in its report
4 that certain types of relatively low-yield nuclear
5 weapons can be employed to generate potentially cat-
6 astrophic EMP effects over wide geographic areas,
7 and designs for variants of such weapons may have
8 been illicitly trafficked for a quarter-century.

9 (4) According to the EMP Commission, China
10 and Russia have considered limited nuclear attack
11 options that, unlike their Cold War plans, employ
12 EMP as the primary or sole means of attack.

13 (5) The EMP Commission recognizes a deter-
14 mined adversary can achieve an EMP attack capa-
15 bility without having a high level of sophistication.

16 (6) Having already conducted tests from sea-
17 based platforms, detonating warheads at the highest
18 point of the missile trajectory, Iran is exploring a
19 workable research program to deliver an EMP at-
20 tack against its enemies.

21 (e) IRANIAN DEPENDENCE ON PETROLEUM IM-
22 PORTS.—Congress finds the following:

23 (1) Iran is OPEC's largest oil producer after
24 Saudi Arabia with a refining capacity of some 1.5
25 million barrels per day but still has to import

1 around one-third of its gasoline to meet domestic de-
2 mand.

3 (2) Iran imports around 140,000 barrels per
4 day of gasoline, most of which is shipped in 30,000-
5 to 35,000-ton cargoes to the Mideast Gulf port of
6 Bandar Abbas.

7 (3) An interruption or significant limiting of
8 the supply of gasoline to Iran would considerably im-
9 pact the Iranian economy.

10 (4) An international restriction of gasoline ex-
11 ports to Iran would significantly bolster current dip-
12 lomatic initiatives.

13 (5) On June 4, 2008, then-Senator Barack
14 Obama said, “we should work with Europe, Japan,
15 and the Gulf states to find every avenue outside the
16 United Nations to isolate the Iranian regime—from
17 cutting off loan guarantees and expanding financial
18 sanctions to banning the export of refined petroleum
19 to Iran.”.

20 (6) On October 7, 2008, then-Senator Barack
21 Obama said, “Iran right now imports gasoline . . .
22 if we can prevent them from importing the gasoline
23 that they need . . . that starts changing their cost-
24 benefit analysis. That starts putting the squeeze on
25 them.”.

1 (f) VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.—Congress finds
2 the following:

3 (1) Reports indicate the Government of Iran di-
4 rected Iranian children to clear the minefields dur-
5 ing the Iran-Iraq war, resulting in their deaths.

6 (2) The Department of State’s International
7 Religious Freedom Report of 2008 concluded that
8 there was a continued deterioration of the Govern-
9 ment of Iran’s extremely poor status regarding re-
10 spect for religious freedom, and every year since
11 1999 the Department of State has designated Iran
12 a “country of particular concern” under the Inter-
13 national Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for its viola-
14 tions of religious freedom.

15 (3) The Department of State’s Human Rights
16 Report of 2008 concluded the Government of Iran’s
17 poor human rights record worsened, and it contin-
18 ued to commit numerous serious abuses.

19 (4) The Government of Iran severely limits citi-
20 zens’ right to modify their government peacefully
21 through free and fair elections.

22 (5) The Government of Iran carries out sum-
23 mary executions, including executions of minors, fol-
24 lowing trials that lack due process.

1 (6) Many arrests in Iran are carried out by
2 plain-clothed officials who fail to identify themselves
3 and who do not produce an official arrest warrant
4 or state a reason for the arrest.

5 (7) On December 18, 2008, for the sixth con-
6 secutive year, the United Nations General Assembly
7 adopted a resolution on Iran expressing “deep con-
8 cern at ongoing systematic violations of human
9 rights”.

10 (8) The Government of Iran systemically sup-
11 presses the freedoms of expression and the press,
12 and severely limits the freedom of assembly of its
13 own citizens.

14 (9) The Government of Iran takes away the
15 rights of women in Iran, including their right to the
16 freedoms of movement, association, thought, con-
17 science, and religion, as well as freedom from coer-
18 cion in matters of belief.

19 (10) Iranian President Mahmoud
20 Ahmadinejad’s denials of the Holocaust and state-
21 ments calling for Israel to be “wiped off the map”
22 have created a climate of fear among Iran’s Jewish
23 community.

24 (11) The Government of Iran continues to
25 abuse and torture detainees and prisoners, including

1 carrying out severe punishments such as amputa-
2 tions and floggings.

3 (12) On February 9, 2009, Malcolm Smart, Di-
4 rector of Amnesty International’s Middle East and
5 North Africa programme said, “Thirty years on,
6 some of the worst abuses of the Shah’s time—tor-
7 ture, executions and the suppression of legitimate
8 dissent—are still being replicated in Iran, despite
9 the efforts of the country’s growing and valiant com-
10 munity of human rights defenders.”.

11 (13) Christians, in particular Evangelicals and
12 other Protestants, in Iran continue to be subject to
13 harassment, arrests, close surveillance, and impris-
14 onment, and many converts from Islam to Christi-
15 anity have fled the country for fear of persecution.

16 (14) According to Amnesty International, peo-
17 ple in Iran are still enduring a catalogue of human
18 rights abuses, 30 years after the Islamic Revolution.

19 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—It shall be policy of the United
21 States to seek normalization of relations with Iran once
22 the following conditions are satisfied:

23 (1) The Government of Iran denounces the use
24 of terrorism as a means to further political ends.

1 (2) The Government of Iran turns over to the
2 United States Al Qaeda members known by the Gov-
3 ernment of Iran to be living in Iran.

4 (3) The Government of Iran stops providing
5 material support to groups designated as terrorist
6 organizations under United States law.

7 (4) The Government of Iran ceases support for
8 the wounding and killing of United States and coali-
9 tion forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

10 (5) The Government of Iran dismantles its
11 chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weap-
12 ons programs and commits to combating the pro-
13 liferation of such weapons.

14 (6) The Government of Iran ceases the develop-
15 ment and testing of long range ballistic missiles.

16 (7) The Government of Iran respects the
17 boundaries, sovereignty, and right to exist of its
18 neighbors, including the State of Israel, and contrib-
19 utes positively toward the Israeli-Palestinian peace
20 process.

21 (8) The Government of Iran upholds and de-
22 fends the human rights and civil liberties of its citi-
23 zens.

24 (b) POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT.—
25 The United States shall take the following actions:

1 (1) The United States shall cooperate with al-
2 lies to employ all instruments of national power to
3 prevent the successful development or deployment of
4 a nuclear weapons capability by the Government of
5 Iran.

6 (2) The United States may not compromise ele-
7 ments of national missile defense systems, or offen-
8 sive strategic weapons in exchange for Russia put-
9 ting pressure on Iran.

10 (3) The United States shall cooperate with al-
11 lies to expeditiously deploy a missile defense system
12 that is capable of intercepting Iranian short, me-
13 dium, and long-range missiles aimed at the United
14 States or North Atlantic Treaty Organization
15 (NATO) allies.

16 (4) The United States shall support the right of
17 Israel to protect itself and shall remain committed
18 to the defense of Israel, including support of the de-
19 velopment of a national missile defense shield for
20 Israel to defeat missile and rocket attack.

21 **SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF**
22 **1996 AND RELATED PROVISIONS.**

23 (a) EXPLANATION OF SANCTIONS TO REFINED PE-
24 TROLEUM.—Section 4 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996

1 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end
2 the following new subsection:

3 “(g) UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN.—It
4 shall be the policy of the United States to encourage for-
5 eign governments to—

6 “(1) direct state-owned entities to cease all in-
7 vestment in Iran’s energy sector and all exports of
8 refined petroleum resources to Iran; and

9 “(2) persuade, and, where possible, require pri-
10 vate entities based in their territories to cease all in-
11 vestment in Iran’s energy sector and all exports of
12 refined petroleum resources to Iran.”.

13 (b) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOP-
14 MENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN AND EXPORT
15 OF REFINED PETROLEUM RESOURCES TO IRAN.—Section
16 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701
17 note) is amended to read as follows:

18 “(a) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOP-
19 MENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN.—Except as
20 provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 2
21 or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1)
22 through (6) of section 6 if the President determines that
23 a person has, with actual knowledge, on or after the date
24 of the enactment of this subsection, made an investment
25 of \$20,000,000 or more (or any combination of invest-

1 ments of at least \$5,000,000 each, which in the aggregate
2 equals or exceeds \$20,000,000 in any 12-month period),
3 that directly and significantly contributed to the enhance-
4 ment of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources of
5 Iran.”.

6 (c) MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DE-
7 VELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR
8 OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.—Section 5(b) of the
9 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
10 amended to read as follows:

11 “(b) MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
12 DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR
13 OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.—The President shall
14 impose two or more of the sanctions described in para-
15 graphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the President deter-
16 mines that a person has, on or after the date of the enact-
17 ment of the subsection, provided Iran with refined petro-
18 leum resources, engaged in an activity, including produc-
19 tion, brokerage, insurance, and tanker delivery services,
20 that could contribute to Iran’s ability to import refined
21 petroleum resources, or exported, transferred, or otherwise
22 provided to Iran any goods, services, technology, or other
23 items knowing that the provision of such goods, services,
24 technology, or other items would contribute materially to
25 the ability of Iran to—

1 “(1) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or
2 nuclear weapons or related technologies; or

3 “(2) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers
4 and types of advanced conventional weapons.”.

5 (d) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IMPORTATION OR
6 EXPORTATION OF CERTAIN GOODS OR SERVICES.—Sec-
7 tion 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701
8 note) is amended—

9 (1) by redesignating subsections (e) through (f)
10 as subsections (d) through (g), respectively;

11 (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the fol-
12 lowing new subsection:

13 “(c) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IMPORTATION
14 OR EXPORTATION OF CERTAIN GOODS OR SERVICES.—
15 Except as provided in subsection (g), the President shall
16 impose 2 or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs
17 (1) through (6) of section 6 if the President determines
18 that a person has, on or after the date of the enactment
19 of this subsection—

20 “(1) imported, or financed such importation of,
21 any goods or services of Iranian origin, other than
22 Iranian-origin publications and materials imported
23 for news publications or news broadcast dissemina-
24 tion; or

1 “(2) exported to Iran, the Government of Iran,
2 or to any entity owned or controlled by the Govern-
3 ment of Iran, or finances such exportation of, any
4 goods or technology, other than goods for humani-
5 tarian purposes.”;

6 (3) in subsection (a), by striking “subsection
7 (f)” and inserting “subsection (g)”;

8 (4) in subsection (d), as redesignated by para-
9 graph (1) of this subsection—

10 (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
11 by striking “subsections (a) and (b)” and in-
12 serting “subsections (a), (b), and (c)”;

13 (B) in paragraph (1), by striking “sub-
14 section (a) or (b)” and inserting “subsection
15 (a), (b), or (c)”;

16 (5) in subsection (g), as redesignated by para-
17 graph (1) of this subsection—

18 (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
19 by striking “subsection (a) or (b)” and insert-
20 ing “subsection (a), (b), or (c)”;

21 (B) by adding at the end the following new
22 sentence:

23 “The exceptions specified in this subsection shall not
24 apply to the Iranian state broadcasting system, in-

1 cluding Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
2 (IRIB).”.

3 (e) ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.—Section 6(6) of the
4 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
5 amended—

6 (1) by striking “The President”; and inserting
7 the following new subparagraph:

8 “(A) IN GENERAL.—The President”; and

9 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
10 paragraphs:

11 “(B) FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The Presi-
12 dent shall, under such regulations as the Presi-
13 dent may prescribe, prohibit any transactions in
14 foreign exchange by the sanctioned person.

15 “(C) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The
16 President shall, under such regulations as the
17 President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers
18 of credit or payments between, by, through, or
19 to any financial institution, to the extent that
20 such transfers or payments involve any interest
21 of the sanctioned person.

22 “(D) PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS.—The
23 President shall, under such regulations as the
24 President may prescribe, prohibit any acquisi-
25 tion, holding, withholding, use, transfer, with-

1 drawal, transportation, importation, or expor-
2 tation of, dealing in, or exercising any right,
3 power, or privilege with respect to, or trans-
4 actions involving, any property in which the
5 sanctioned person has any interest by any per-
6 son, or with respect to any property, subject to
7 the jurisdiction of the United States.”.

8 (f) WAIVER.—Section 9(c) of the Iran Sanctions Act
9 of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at
10 the end the following new paragraph:

11 “(4) OVERSIGHT HEARINGS.—If the President
12 exercises the waiver authority under this subsection,
13 Congress shall, not later than 30 days after receipt
14 of the report under paragraph (1), conduct oversight
15 hearings with respect to the exercise of such waiver
16 authority.”.

17 (g) CERTAIN BIENNIAL REPORTS.—Section 10 of
18 the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note)
19 is amended by adding at the end the following new sub-
20 sections:

21 “(d) BIENNIAL REPORTS ON REFINED PETROLEUM
22 EXPORTS TO IRAN.—Not later than six months after the
23 date of the enactment of this subsection and every six
24 months thereafter, the President shall transmit to the ap-

1 appropriate congressional committees a report describing,
2 with respect to the preceding six-month period—

3 “(1) any person that has provided Iran with re-
4 fined petroleum resources, and the petroleum re-
5 sources so provided;

6 “(2) any activity, including production, broker-
7 age, insurance, and tanker delivery services, engaged
8 in that could contribute to Iran’s ability to import
9 refined petroleum resources;

10 “(3) any person that has provided Iran with
11 goods, services, or technology for refining petroleum,
12 and the goods, services, or technology so provided;
13 and

14 “(4) steps taken by the President to carry out
15 the policy set forth in section 4(g).

16 “(e) BIENNIAL REPORTS ON POLITICAL LEADER-
17 SHIP AND OTHER INDIVIDUAL AND BUSINESS INTER-
18 ESTS.—Not later than six months after the date of the
19 enactment of this subsection and every six months there-
20 after, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the
21 appropriate congressional committees a report that—

22 “(1) lists the top political leadership of Iran,
23 the individuals and corporate entities supporting
24 such political leadership, and the foreign trading

1 partners of such individuals and corporate entities;
2 and

3 “(2) establishes a list of key individuals and
4 commercial entities associated with the Islamic Rev-
5 olution Guards Corps (IRGC) and the foreign trad-
6 ing partners of the IRGC.”.

7 **SEC. 5. DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY OPTIONS FOR PRE-**
8 **VENTING IRAN FROM DEVELOPING OR DE-**
9 **PLOYING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY.**

10 (a) **DECLARATION OF POLICY.**—Congress declares
11 that the United States is wholly capable, willing, and
12 ready to use military force to prevent Iran from obtaining
13 or developing a nuclear weapons capability.

14 (b) **DEVELOPMENT.**—As part of a United States pol-
15 icy that uses all instruments of national power to prevent
16 the Government of Iran from successfully developing nu-
17 clear weapons and the means to hold United States inter-
18 ests at risk with those weapons, the Secretary of Defense
19 shall develop and maintain viable military options to pre-
20 vent the successful development or deployment of a nu-
21 clear weapons capability by the Government of Iran.

22 (c) **REPORT.**—Not later than six months after the en-
23 actment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary
24 of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Serv-
25 ices of the House of Representatives and the Committee

1 on Armed Services of the Senate a report describing the
2 following regarding military options toward the Govern-
3 ment of Iran:

4 (1) An update on Iranian nuclear and ballistic
5 missile threat to include all ballistic missile testing
6 conducted, the status of Iran's ability to produce or
7 acquire fissile material, and nuclear stockpile
8 changes in the previous one-year period.

9 (2) An outline of Department of Defense mili-
10 tary options toward the Government of Iran to
11 counter a nuclear ballistic missile threat.

12 (3) A readiness update on the status of forces
13 used in the various military options.

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